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Abstract 
In two laboratory studies involving 285 undergraduate students presented with a one-
shot real choice we observe a systematic influence of time delay on the preferences for 
two lotteries, equal in expected value, but different in the degree of probability and 
outcome. The more the outcome is postponed (2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months), 
the more individuals prefer the lottery offering a higher value (400 Euro) but a lower 
probability (.02) compared to the one offering a lower value (14 Euro) but a higher 
probability (.60). We explain these findings assuming a savoring hypothesis according 
to which, for highly emotional events, individuals prefer to postpone the desirable 
outcome, enjoying the savoring experience of anticipating the future emotions. It also 
suggests that for decisions where uncertainty resolution is postponed in the future, 
people will underweight the probability and overweight the outcome. 
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Influence of time delay on choice between gambles: Savoring the emotion 
 
     People  who  purchase  standard  lottery  tickets  make  an  intertemporal  decision  under 
uncertainty since they pay some money now to buy the chance of winning a considerable 
prize in the future. Lotteries derive their popularity from the large jackpot prizes that can be 
won, while, it is noteworthy that people disregard the low chances of winning associated to 
those large prizes.  
     In terms of cognitive processes, this can be explained assuming that when people face an 
intertemporal decision, for which both the outcome and the uncertainty will be resolved in the 
future, our mind will anticipate the experience of the future outcomes while it will disregard 
the probabilities associated to those outcomes. In other words time delay would act as an 
amplifier of the savoring experience of the outcome while reducing the perception of the 
probability of that outcome. 
     Since the publication of the standard discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937), 
researchers have studied human and animal intertemporal decisions focusing mainly on 
hyperbolic discounting: people’s decline in discount rate as the reward moves farther 
into  the  future  (see  Ainslie,  1991;  Loewenstein  &  Prelec,  1992;  Laibson,  1997; 
O’donoghue  &  Rabin,  2000).  Few  have  studied  the  opposite  behavior:  people’s 
increase  in  discount  rate  as  the  reward  moves  farther  into  the  future.  Loewenstein 
(1987)  was  the  first  to  record  an  evidence  of  this  tendency  and  referred  to  it  as 
negative  discounting.  In  his  illustrative  study,  Lowenstein  asked  30  undergraduate 
students to specify the most they would pay now to obtain four dollars (a monetary 
outcome)  and  to  obtain  a  kiss  from  a  movie  star  of  your  choice  (a  non  monetary 
outcome),  providing    them  with  a  series  of  time  delays:  immediately,  twenty-four 
hours,  three  days,  one  year,  ten  years.  The  experiment  showed  that  the  monetary 
outcome  exhibited  the  predicted  discounting  curve,  that  is,  subjects  preferred  to Time delay and choice    4 
   
consume the item as soon as possible, however, when observing the pattern of  the 
non-monetary outcome, subjects on average were willing to pay more to experience a 
kiss with a delay of 3 days, than an immediate kiss. The behavior showed a concave 
pattern that increased systematically for little delays (twenty-four hours, three days) 
but decreased for larger delays (1 year, 10 years). To explain why people sometimes 
delay  desirable  outcomes  he  introduced  the  concept  of  anticipatory  emotions 
(savoring) predicting that, for desirable outcomes, the longer the anticipation period, 
the greater the pleasure. Also, it must be noted that though there is more total pleasure, 
traditional time discounting explains why people don't delay forever. 
     Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) extended Loewenstein’s (1987) analysis to uncertain 
prospects  studying  the  correlation  between  resolution  preferences  and  the 
attractiveness or aversiveness of the gamble. They discovered two key findings. First, 
that, keeping EV constant, attractiveness ratings were mainly driven by the amount of 
the potential  gain (up  to $9000) than by the security of a lower gain (up to $970). 
Second, that hypothetical willingness to pay to speed up the resolution of the gamble 
was higher for less attractive gambles, in accordance with Loewenstein’s predictions.  
     Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) measured hypothetical ratings to hypothetical situations in 
a  repeated  measure  design.  In  the  present  experiment  we  tested  the  robustness  of 
Loewenstein’s model (1987) and Lovallo and Kahneman’s (2000) results in a real gambling 
choice,  using  a  one-shot  task,  although  still  in  an  experimental  setting.  We  designed  an 
experiment to test directly the effect of time delays on the preference for two lotteries that 
differ in attractiveness but have equal EV. As anticipated, we expect that time delay will 
amplify the savoring experience of the attractive outcome, hence increase the preferences for 
the more attractive, emotional lottery.  
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Study 1 
Method 
     Eighty-five undergraduate students took part in the experiment (56% males, 44% 
females;  mean  age  22.2).  Participants  were  asked  to  choose  among  two  lotteries. 
Lottery A (low emotion lottery) offered a high chance (60%) of winning a low value 
(14€) while lottery B (high emotion lottery) offered a low chance (2%) of winning a 
high  value  (400€)
1.  The  lotteries  were  presented  via  a  computer  monitor  where 
participants could see the two options described both numerically and graphically (see 
Figure  1).  The  game  was  true,  in  the  sense  that,  participants  received  real  money 
according to the result of the lottery. 
     Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: immediate (n = 42) 
and delay (n = 43). Participants in the immediate condition were told that they will 
receive the  outcome immediately.  Participants in the delay  condition  were told  that 
they  would  be  enabled  to  choose  now  but  they  would  play  the  lottery,  and  in  case 
receive the prize, after 1 month.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
----------------------------------------------- 
Results 
     In  the  immediate  condition,  79%  (n  =  33)  of  the  participants  choose  the  low 
emotion lottery (lottery A) and 21% (n = 9) the high emotion lottery (lottery B). The 
majority of our sample, therefore, had a preference for the high probability - low value 
lottery, the so called P-bets, in accordance with previous literature (see, for example, 
Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987). In the delay condition, however, 56% of the participants 
(n  =  24)  choose  the  low  emotion  lottery  (lottery  A)  while  44%  (n  =  19)  the    high 
emotion  lottery  (lottery  B),  resulting  in  an  increase  of  23%  in  preferences  for  the Time delay and choice    6 
   
emotional  lottery.  A  chi-square  comparison  of  participants’  choices  between  the 
immediate  and  the  delay  condition  showed  that  the  preferences  for  the  emotional 
lottery increased significantly , χ(1) = 4.981; p = .026, prep = .915. In accordance with 
our hypothesis, time delay increased the attractiveness of the low probability – high 
value lottery. These data suggest that time delay acts as an amplifier of the savoring 
experience of the event while reducing the weight attached to the probability that the 
event will happen. In other words, people will have more time to derive utility from it 
if the outcome of the choice is postponed one month. Ideally, larger is the time delay, 
larger should be the utility derived from it, at least up to a certain extent (we suppose 
that for certain magnitudes of time delay, such as 1 year, this effect might be reduced 




     Assuming the “savoring” model proposed by Loewenstein, we should expect that as 
time  delay  increases,  the  emotional  outcome  will  increases  in  attractiveness 




Two-hundred undergraduate students took part in the experiment (55% males, 
45% females; mean age 21.8). The procedure and stimuli were identical to those used 
in Study 1. Participants were asked to choose between lottery A (14€; .60 and lottery B 
(400€;  .02).  As  for  Study  1,  the  game  was  real,  that  is,  the  lottery  was  fair,  and 
participants received money according to the result of the lottery. The only difference 
were the time delays. In Study 2 we choose to compare an immediate condition with Time delay and choice    7 
   
three other conditions differing in time delay: A short delay (2 weeks), a long delay (3 
months) and a very long delay (6 months). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four conditions (50 in each condition). Participants in the immediate condition 
were  told  that  they  will  receive  the  outcome  immediately.  Participants  in  the  delay 
conditions were told that they would be enabled to choose now but they would play the 
lottery, and in case receive the prize, after [2 weeks; 3 months; 6 months]. 
 
Results and discussion 
    Participants  choosing  the  emotional  lottery  (lottery  B)  were  24%  (n=12)  in  the 
immediate condition. They increased to 30% (n=15) when the outcome was postponed 
by 2 weeks delay, which was not a significant raise, χ(1) = 0.457; p = .499, prep = .501.  
However,  they  increased  to  46%  (n  =  23)  when  the  outcome  was  postponed  by  3 
months, which was a significant difference, χ(1) = 5.319; p = .021, prep = .925, and, 
they increased even more, up to 56% (n = 28), when the delay was set to 6 months, 
χ(1) = 10.667; p = .001, prep = .986. Figure 2 shows clearly the increasing pattern. The 
emotional lottery, presenting a chance of winning 400€, became more attractive, and 
participants became more risk seeking, as the time delay increased. Kendall’s Tau-b 
association  score  indicates  a  positive  significant  relationship  between  the  condition 
and the choice, corr. coeff. = .257; p = .0001.  
     The  same  results  can  be  examined  using  odds  ratio.  The  odds  of  a  participant 
assigned to the 2 weeks delay condition of choosing the emotional lottery relative to 
the odds of a participant assigned to the immediate condition is an odds ratio of 1.36, 
which suggests that participants in the 2 weeks condition are 1.36 times more likely, 
than not, to choose the emotional lottery compared to control participants. This value 
increases to 2.69 when the immediate condition is compared to the 3 months condition 
and increases to 4.03 when it is compared to the 6 months condition, which means that Time delay and choice    8 
   
participants  assigned  a  3  months  delay  are  2.69  times  more  likely  to  choose  the 
emotional lottery and those assigned a 6 months delay are 4.03 times more likely to 
choose the emotional lottery than participants in the immediate condition. This gives a 
measure of the strong effect of time delay in increasing the preference for the low-
probability high-value lottery. 
------------------------------ 
insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------------ 
 
General Conclusions      
    In two laboratory studies with real gambles we observed a systematic influence of 
time delay on the preferences for two lotteries, equal in expected value, but different 
in the degree of probabilities and outcomes. The more the outcome is postponed, the 
more  individuals  prefer  the  lottery  offering  a  high  value  but  a  low  probability 
compared  to  the  one  offering  a  low  value  but  a  high  probability.  This  means  that 
probability  and  outcome  loom  differently  in  present  and  future  choices.  In  choices 
involving  our  future  we  tend  to  overestimate  the  value  of  the  outcome  and 
underestimate its probability, compared to choices involving the present. This data are 
an evidence of the “savoring” hypothesis. In particular, if people are forced to wait a 
delay before resolving the uncertainty and eventually obtain the desired outcome they 
will prefer to spend this waiting time thinking (and savoring) about the possibility of 
having a high desirable outcome, such as a 400 Euro prize, instead that a less desirable 
one, such as the 14 Euro prize.  
     This  savoring  behavior  in  intertemporal  choice  has  been  variously  supported  by 
other evidences. For example, psychophysiological studies of people’s reactions to a 
“countdown” experience at the end of which they receive a painful electric shock of Time delay and choice    9 
   
varying intensity  with some  probability, show  that reactions are  correlated with  the 
intensity  but  not  with  the  probability  of  the  anticipated  shock  (Monat,  Averill,  & 
Lazarus,  1972).  Chew  and  Ho  (1994)  found  similar  evidence  studying  people’s 
hopefulness, that is the sensation experienced when there is enjoyment in delaying the 
resolution  of  uncertainty.  They  found  instances  where  participants  showed  more 
hopefulness  associated  with  a  small  probability  of  occurrence  of  a  large  gain. 
Interestingly, the degree of hopefulness was not correlated with attitude towards risk. 
     Why  should  the  future  increase  the  relative  importance  of  the  potential  gain 
compared to the probability? We suppose that this effect is related to the easy with 
which  one  can  imagine  a  potential  desirable  outcome  and,  at  the  same  time,  the 
difficulty  or  impossibility  of  creating  images  of  uncertainty.  Loewenstein  &  Lerner 
(2003),  say  that  anticipatory  emotions  arise  as  a  reaction  to  mental  images  of  a 
decision’s outcomes (Damasio, 1994) and such images are discrete and not affected by 
probability.  In  our  hypothesis,  time  delay  would  fosters  people’s  use  of  the  mental 
images, as required by the cognitive functions of foreseeing the consequences of our 
actions, but images can be implemented only for the outcome, since the image of a 
probability level would be quite inaccessible.  
In  line  with  this  explanation  is  the  finding  of  Nowlis,  Mandel  and  McCabe 
(2004) that a 30 minutes delay had a positive effect on enjoyment of chocolate bars, 
especially  when  placing  the  product  in  front  of  the  consumer  during  the  wait 
(increased vividness of the imagined consumption). Similar findings were also found 
by  Kivetz  and  Simonson  (2002)  in  a  study  were  they  asked  participants  to  choose 
between a luxury good (1 hour massage at a spa) and an equal prize in cash in two 
delay conditions (1 week vs. 14 weeks) between subjects design. Increasing the time 
delay  between  the  decision  and  its  consequences  tended  to  enhance  the  rate  of 
precommitment  to  the  hedonic  luxury  (from  18%  to  36%),  in  accordance  with  our Time delay and choice    10 
   
savoring  hypothesis.  Their  explanation  of  the  resukts,  however,  was  somewhat 
different from ours because they assume that consumers are more likely to precommit 
to hedonic luxury items when the consequences of their decision are delayed. More 
precisely, given the difficulty of justifying indulgence consumers are more likely to 
precommit  to  selecting  a  hedonic  luxury  over  cash  when  the  concreteness  and 
psychological cost of such precommitments are lower. We explain the same finding, 
however,  as  a  savoring  mechanism  where  participants  are  more  attracted  by  the 
emotional prize, rather than the cash prize, when the drawing is delayed, due to the 
capability  of  anticipating  the  positive  affect  attached  to  the  image  of  the  prize. 
Coherent with our explanation is also a work by Ahlbrecht and Weber (1996) showing 
that some subjects prefer early and some prefer late resolution of uncertainty. They 
explain this results by saying that early resolution of uncertainty might offer planning 
benefits, late resolution might be preferred for decision makers who want to hope as 
long as possible for a good consequence. The savoring mechanism might also explain 
myopic risk seeking behavior in long-term decisions such as drug consumption. 
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Footnotes 
1 The expected value of the two lotteries was the same (EV = 8€ for lottery A and EV 
= 8.40€ for lottery B). Little differences in EV between the lotteries was due to the 
necessity of expressing the probability in integer numbers. According to the Expected 
Utility models (Von Neumann e Morgenstern, 1947) and the Discounted utility model 
(Samuelson, 1937) we should not observe differences between the choices made by 
participants in the immediate condition and in the delay condition. Time delay and choice    14 
   
Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Screen  display used to describe the two lotteries 
Figure 2. Percentage of participants choosing the emotional lottery as a function of time 
delay.Time delay and choice    15 
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